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Abstract 
A brief statement on the customary foundations of 
economic processes and institutions and a review of 
theoretical approaches to custom. 
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&XVWRP. The term ‘custom’, or ‘social custom’, refers to the 
set of habits, attitudes, and convictions prevailing in a 
society, as inherited from the past. Used in another sense, 
custom refers to the forces which shape those habits, 
attitudes, and convictions. Thus it may be said that the forces 
of custom mold the prevailing conventions, mores, usages, 
manners, and habits as well as the prevailing preferences, 
behavioral inclinations, moral attitudes, and social norms. 
Phrased differently, the term ‘custom’ refers to the tacit 
elements of  →culture, that is, to those parts which are not 
formalized or institutionalized but emerge and stabilize 
spontaneously, and to the forces that govern these 
regularities. The formalized and institutionalized parts of 
culture – formalized law, religious organization, and other 
cultural conventions, institutions, and artifacts – rely on 
elements of custom, and are often shaped by the same 
behavioral tendencies which give rise to custom.  
Social and economic structures and processes are thoroughly 
permeated by elements of custom - customary ways of 
behaving, of thinking, and of evaluating all kinds of actions 
and events. The economic and social institutions in any given 
society rely in a fundamental way on prevailing customs. Yet 
custom cannot be taken as a given for purposes of long-term 
analysis because it is molded, bent and shaped by the very 
social and economic processes which build on it.  
Custom as a system. The amalgam of habits, attitudes, and 
convictions to which we refer as ‘custom’ forms an 
interlocking complex, where each element stabilizes the 
others. Consider customary attitudes which link social status 
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to skin color. These prejudices will give rise to various 
rationalizations reconfirming and stabilizing discriminatory 
attitudes and habits. As a result, the discriminatory habits, 
values, preferences and cognitions mutually reinforce each 
other. Further, customs are mutually dependent upon each 
other. The custom of greeting by raising one’s hat cannot be 
maintained without the custom of wearing a hat, for example 
and has vanished more recently along with the custom of hat 
wearing. Typically, each custom depends on many others. 
The system of habits, behavioral inclinations and associated 
convictions must be conceived as a system – not in any 
mechanical sense, but rather as a very comprehensive net of 
mostly weak and vague interdependencies. 
Custom as an agent of production. Regarding the effect of 
custom on economic performance, both its constraining and 
its enabling effects have been stressed. Many economists 
emphasise that custom often presents an impediment to 
economic change and social development. The economist 
Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) spoke of the ‘yoke of custom’ 
as ‘hindering the method of production and the character of 
producers from developing themselves freely’, and the 
economist John Stuart Mill (1806–73) saw competition and 
custom as two alternative mechanisms of economic 
coordination, with competition carrying progress, and held 
that the sphere of competition would expand while the 
sphere of custom would shrink over time and in the course 
of economic and social modernization. 
On the other hand, custom is an important agent of 
production, easing or even enabling production and social 
coordination in many important ways. Alfred Marshall has 
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emphasized this positive aspect of custom as well. He 
observed that businesses, as organizational forms, rely on 
specific elements of business morality and would not be 
feasible without it. Contracting – a prerequisite of all kinds 
of economic coordination – is largely of a relational nature 
and not usefully enforceable in court (→ relational 
contracts. Instead it relies on the presence and mutual 
acceptance of business practices. In the old days, a 
businessman’s handshake was worth more than a written 
contract, and cognate practices survive in modern specialized 
markets.  This is of obvious advantage for easing economic 
transactions (→ transaction cost economics).  
Further, custom and competition are not mutually exclusive, 
as Mill thought, but often mutually complementary. Business 
morality is a case in point. As another example consider 
gratuities. A custom of giving, say, 10% as a normal gratuity 
for certain services may enhance economic performance. The 
customer may give less if dissatisfied, and give more if 
satisfied. In this way, an effective incentive for maintaining 
the quality of the service is established which would be 
absent without the custom, entailing the problem of quality 
deterioration.  
Inadequacy of functionalistic and individualistic 
explanations. This is not to say that customs – such as tipping 
– form ‘optimally’ in the sense of establishing themselves 
such that economic efficiency is optimized for the relevant 
transactions. Empirically, tipping practices in similar 
countries like the US and Australia differ significantly. Given 
the similarity of these societies, we would expect roughly 
similar standards from an efficiency point of view, but actual 
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practices diverge. Further, other customs – ownership in 
human beings in slave societies, or caste systems, to name 
just two – seem not to foster economic or other types of 
efficiency. Their possible positive side effects in terms of 
efficiency – if there are any – can usually be taken care of by 
alternative and preferable arrangements. The →functionalist 
position that custom forms ‘optimally’ seems problematic. 
Custom is neither fully ‘optimal’ nor entirely detrimental. In 
some ways it is an impediment, in others an important 
productive asset (→social capital). In both senses it is an 
important agent of production. 
The example of tipping – relating to a widely observed 
custom in modern economies, which contributes significantly 
to income in some occupations – illustrates also the other 
point that custom cannot be explained in terms of self-
interest, often identified with →methodological 
individualism. This approach falls short of accounting for the 
giving of gratuities in non-repeated exchanges. Even if the 
individuals are assumed to prefer conforming to the social 
norm of giving gratuities, or are fearing social sanctions by 
not conforming, each individual will find that there is scope 
for cornering the custom in a self-seeking way, for instance 
by rounding downward rather than upward in cases of 
doubt. This would drive average gratuities down over time 
and would thereby extinguish the custom. Most customary 
practices are beset by such problems of erosion. 
Reciprocity. Customs like giving gratuities seem to rely on 
reciprocity, i.e., on a desire of the individuals to reciprocate 
gifts with counter-gifts, and to retaliate offenses with 
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counter-offenses (→ reciprocity, →social exchange). 
Consider a market where gratuities are not customary. The 
customers may pay, however, more than the stated price if 
satisfied, simply by leaving five Dollars to cover a bill of $ 
4.73, but they cannot pay less, even if dissatisfied. Customers 
who are reciprocators will behave this way. As a 
consequence, tipping may occur occasionally, gradually 
making it acceptable and customary. There will emerge an 
average positive level of gratuities in the market. Customers, 
motivated by reciprocity, will start giving some gratuities 
even for average service and will deviate in the one or the 
other direction, according to the quality of the service 
provided.  
Many aspects of economic interaction can be understood in 
this manner. →Relational contracting, i.e. the reliance on 
tacit mutual obligations in contract interpretation and 
execution, relates to this class of phenomena. Other 
economically important instances are provided by the wide-
spread practice of firms to pay wages in excess of what 
would be required to attract workers, and the worker’s 
preparedness to work better than strictly ‘by the rules’. Firms 
can thrive on these behavioral propensities by creating a 
strong corporate culture. Further, the keeping of promises 
and the faithful execution of contractual obligations – 
fundamental to economic performance - may be understood 
in terms of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity builds on certain standards of entitlement and 
obligation, as reciprocation is prompted by deviations from 
what is considered the norm. The norm itself is a matter of 
custom, with normality generating the norm. In this sense, 
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reciprocity builds on custom. The desire to reciprocate itself 
can be traced to a desire of humans to establish regularities 
and outbalance deviations from those regularities by 
appropriate counter deviations.  
Conventions. Conventions are important elements of 
custom. Typical conventions relate to greeting, expressing 
agreement, holding market days, or using certain 
commodities rather than others as means of exchange. The 
essential aspect of a convention is that it is reasonable for 
everybody to follow it if the others comply. (In terms of 
→game theory, a convention is a →Nash equilibrium.) An 
obvious example is provided by the convention of driving on 
the right-hand side of the road in some countries, and 
driving on the left-hand side in others. Given that everybody 
drives on the right-hand side, it is most expedient for 
everyone to do the same. 
Many approaches to problems of social interaction seek to 
understand all kinds of social regularities, including 
institutions, as conventions. The prototype argument has 
been developed by the Austrian economist Carl Menger 
(1840-1921) with regard to the evolution of money: In an 
exchange economy, individuals will accept certain 
commodities for pay even if they have no use for the 
commodity, as long as they can expect to find others who 
accept it in exchange for something they need. If a 
commodity is widely used for exchange purposes, everybody 
will accept it, and it will turn into →money. (Some primitive 
moneys provide counter-examples to this logic, however.) 
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Generalization. Consider the convention of driving on the 
right-hand side of the road. If a traveler, arriving at a foreign 
country, observes that people drive on the right-hand side of 
Harbor Street and Broadway, he will conclude that this is the 
prevailing custom. This inference is, logically speaking, not 
defensible because there is no evidence that the rule applies 
to other roads. Yet the custom is grasped by this kind of 
quick and superficial induction. Many customs which are not 
formally transmitted rely on such spontaneous generalization 
which is a precondition for tacit transmission.  
Generalization is not only important for the transmission of 
a custom; it entails behavioral generalization, too. The 
custom of driving on the right hand side of the street, for 
instance, usually generalizes to walking on the right hand 
side of sidewalks and stairs, and the custom to discriminate 
according to skin color in business transactions generalizes to 
discriminating in other spheres of social life. The converse is 
also true: If market forces bring about a racial integration of 
the workforce in a discriminatory society, this will weaken 
discriminatory attitudes and practices in other spheres of life: 
Equality and equal treatment at work weaken the belief that 
the groups differ in any fundamental way. The theories 
which seek to depict all customs as conventions neglect this 
important motivational force arising from generalization.  
Private customs and social conventions. The custom-as-
convention view neglects also some other behavioral 
tendencies beyond generalization. This is readily seen if we 
consider private habits and customs. The term ‘private 
custom’ refers to the amalgam of habits, convictions, 
attitudes and preferences entertained by individuals not 
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facing social interaction. Arguments relating to social 
interaction are inappropriate here, as there is no interaction. 
Still we find that individuals develop behavioral habits, 
emotional and cognitive attitudes (‘habits of the mind’), and 
preferences in a given setting and do carry these over to new 
situations. These regularities seem often related to 
‘ownership effects’ and ‘commitment effects’, a class of 
phenomena studied by psychologists. Custom seems to rely 
as much on these psychological regularities as it relies on the 
logic of conventions – a point very clearly stated already by 
David Hume (1711-76) in his thoughts about the customary 
origins of property. 
Custom as inertia. Custom is sometimes portrayed as a force 
of inertia, maintaining everything as it is as long no other 
forces come into action. (Alfred Marshall has expressed this 
view, for instance, and evolutionary economics with its 
emphasis on ‘routines’ governing economic interaction 
suggests a similar stance.) The ‘inertia view’ is misleading 
because customs may grow and spread, change over time, or 
erode. The forces governing the growth and decay of 
customs are, in this sense, active forces and not merely forces 
of inertia. As an example, consider the arguments about the 
emergence of gratuities from reciprocity in conjunction with 
the argument about generalization. Taken together, they may 
explain the spreading of the custom of giving gratuities in 
markets where quality can be observed on the spot.  We may 
even speculate that new technologies like the Internet render 
new modes of transaction dominant, bringing about 
supporting customs. These new customs and etiquettes may 
then spread to traditional modes of transactions. It is 
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misleading to depict such processes of growth and 
generalization as instances of inertia. 
Custom as friction. A related view, also developed by Alfred 
Marshall, is that custom amounts to friction in the sense of 
slowing down all processes which would run faster 
otherwise. Eventually, however, custom will adapt to new 
exigencies. If it is expedient to honor promises, honesty will 
spread; if it is profitable to cheat, honesty will be eroded. In 
the long term, custom would be molded entirely by 
economic and other incentives. As an upshot of this 
argument, custom would not matter in the long term and 
could be entirely disregarded for purposes of analysis. It 
would amount to friction, but could not provide an active 
force generating some kind of structure and development. 
Although such an argument points to important phenomena 
which render custom adaptive in many ways, this view 
entirely neglects the active elements of custom. Because of its 
active elements, custom exerts an important influence on its 
own, and the adaptive view of custom is often inadequate. 
Custom as preference. Custom may also be understood as a 
force which molds the preferences of the individuals in a 
given society, making them prefer customary ways of 
behavior. The customary part of their preferences is, 
however, not idiosyncratic but rather shared by many 
individuals in society. In this, it relates directly to →social 
norms. These customary preferences can be taken as 
relatively stable givens to be fixed under a →ceteris paribus 
clause for purposes of short-run analysis. In the long term, 
the adaptive and active aspects of custom formation interact 
with economic processes, however, and it is misleading to 
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hypothetically fix customs, or social norms, under a ceteris 
paribus clause when dealing with issues of long-term 
historical change. 
Custom as a constraint.  Given that people foster certain 
customs and associated preferences, habits and convictions, 
these givens can be considered as constraints for each 
individual’s action. Everybody faces the reactions of the 
other members of society, as molded by custom.  In this 
sense, custom can be viewed as a constraint for purposes of 
partial analysis.  
Custom as a situational force. It is customary to analyze 
economic action by assuming that individuals act according 
to their preferences, subject to certain constraints. As custom 
may be viewed as affecting both preferences and constraints, 
all behavioral effects of custom could be couched in these 
terms, yet this may be misleading. While it is true that all 
action can be framed as determined by tastes and constraints, 
this is a theoretical perspective which complicates matters 
unduly, and thereby hinders rather than helps in 
understanding. A direct approach of viewing customary 
action as prompted by the interpretation and perception of 
the situation, and by a desire of the individuals to live up to 
what ‘the situation demands’, is often preferable.  
Custom usually requires certain actions, as prompted by 
certain situations. The behavior elicited in this way may not 
be brought about by fear of formal or informal sanction; it 
may not be prompted either by a preference for the required 
action as such. A customer may resent leaving a gratuity on 
the restaurant table upon departure because doing so would 
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leave him without the fare for going home by bus. He thinks, 
however, that the waiter deserves a tip because he has served 
him well. If he does not give the gratuity, he will feel uneasy, 
even if he personally condemns and dislikes the custom. The 
choice between giving the gratuity and going home by bus 
differs from his earlier choice between fish and meat because 
it involves an obligation which is prompted by the situation 
and by the custom which prescribes that type of behavior in 
this situation. In this sense, behavior does not reflect a simple 
preference, even if it can be theoretically rephrased in such 
terms. 
The pervasiveness of custom. Custom is a pervasive element 
in social and economic organization. The example of 
gratuities provides a very clear instance of an economically 
relevant custom which can be theoretically detached from 
the underlying transaction. Customs which cannot be 
theoretically isolated as nicely from the ‘purely economic’ 
aspects are much more common and much more important. 
When customary features are tightly integrated with 
economic incentives, institutions, and laws, custom is 
particularly important and remains, at the same time, almost 
invisible. Comparing economies across time and space may 
render these customary influences visible, and help explain 
how some customs have supported certain developments and 
frustrated others, and how the ensuing developments have 
molded those customs in turn. 
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